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[Crim. No. 7263. In Bank. Kov. 19, 1963.]

TIlE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RONALD
KAYE HENDERSON, Defendant and Appellant.
[la-1c] Homicide-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions.-In a
murder prosecution, it WI1.S reversible error for the court to
fail to instruct on its own motion on the legal si~nificallce of
evidence of defendant's mental illness, not amounting to legal
insanity, and to refuse to give defendant's proffered instruction on Illl1.nslaughter, where there was evidence sufficient to inform the court that defendant was relying on the defcn;;c of
diminished responsibility, Ilnd the jury were not properly instructed on intent, the court informing them only that It particular intent was necessary and that to detenllinc such intent
they were to look to the circumstances of the offense and
defendant's sound mind, unless they found him to be an idiot,
lunatic or legally insane, thus barring the jury from consider- I
ing defendant's sole defense of diminished responsibility.
[2) Id.-Insanity or Mental Condition: Evidence-State of Mind.
-A plea of not guilty to a murder charge puts in issue the
existence of the particular mental states that are essential
elements of the two degrees of murder and of manslaughter,
and defendant should be allowed to show that in fnct, subjectively, he did not possess the mental state or states in issue.
[3] Criminal Law-Instructions.-A court should instruct the jury
on every material question on which there is any evidence deserving of any consideration.
[4] Id.-Instructions.-That evidence may not be of a character
to inspire belief does not authorize refusal of an instruction
based on it; however incredible a defendant's testimony mny
be he is entitled to an instruction based on the hypothesis that
it is entirely true.
[5] Id.-Mental Condition-Insanity.-The defense of mental illness not amounting to legal insanity is a significant issue in
any case in which it is raised by substantial evidence; its
purpose and effect are to ameliorate the law governing criminal
responsibility prescribed by the M'Naughton rule.
[6] Homicide-Insanity or Mental Condition: InstructionsMental Condition.-A defendant who was legally sane aeeord-

[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 61 et seq.; Am.Jur., Criminal
Law (1st ed § 32 et seq).
McX. Dig References: [1] HOlllicide, ~ 267; [2] Homidd(', §§ 10,
58; [3,4] Criminal Law, § iil·l: [ii] Crilllinni Law, § 26; [6] Homicide, §§ 10, 197; [7] HOlllicicil', §~ 103, 104: [8] Criminal Law,
§ 303(2); [9] Criminal Law, 303; [10] Homicide, 118; [11]
Criminal Law, § 522t1) j [12] Criminal Law, § 145.
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ing to the M'Xaughton test, but was suffering from a mental
illness that prevented his acting with malice aforethought or
with premeditation and deliberation, cannot be convicted of
first degree murder; and where substantial evidence sullicient
to inform the court that defendant is relying on the defense
of diminished responsibility is received, the court must on its
own Illotion instruct the jury as to the legal significance of such
evidence.
[7a, 7b] Id.-Evidence-Other Crimes.-In a prosecution for
murder in which the circumstances of the killing and the
existence of fresh scratches on defendant's face when he was
arrested indicated that the victim may have been killed during
perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate rape, it was not an
abuse of discretion to admit testimony of a witness that defendant had attacked her sexually a Ulonth before the killing
under circulllstance:; similar to those under which the victim
was killed, such evidence being admissible to prove defendant's
motive for killing the victim and the intent with which the act
was done.
[8] Criminal Law-Evidence-Other Crimes.-Exeept when it
shows merely criminal disposition, evidence that tends logically and by reasonable inference to establish nny fact material
for the pro:;ecution, or to overcome any material fact sought
to be proved by the defense, is admissible although it may
connect the accused with an offense not included in the charge.
[9] Id.-Evidence-Other Crimes.-Although evidence of prior
offenses carries with it the risk that its probative value may
be outweighed by it:; prejudicial effect, evaluation of this risk
rests in the court's sound discretion.
[lOa, lOb] Romicide-Evidence-Photographs.-In a prosecution
for murder in which the circumstances of the killing and the
existence of fresh scratches on defendant's face when he was
arrested indicated that the victim may have been killed during
perpetration of or attempt to perpetrnte rape, it was not an
abuse of discretion to admit photographs of injuries inflicted
on a witness by defendant during a sexual attack a month
before the killing under cil'cumstances similar to those under
which the victim was killed.
[11] Criminal Law-Evldence-Photographs.-When allegedly inflammatory photographs are presented, the court must determine their admissibility ill light of their probative value, other
evidence on the issue, and possible prejudice to defendant.

[8] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 137; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed
§ 316).
[12] Conviction of lesser offense as bar to prosecution for
gl'eatcr on new 11'ial, note, 61 A.IJ.R.2d 1141. See also Cal.Jur.2d,
Criluillal Law, § 179 et seq. i Am.Jur., Criminal Law (1st ed § 38/l\
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[12] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Otfenses.-A defendant
who appeals from an erroneous judgment convicting him of
first dl'grce lllurder and sentencing him to life imprisonment
and obtains a reversal and a retrial may not, after again being convicted of first degree murder, be sentenced to death;
the double jeopardy provisions of the state Constitution (Cal.
Const., art: I, § 13) apply to forbid a greater punishment for
the same crime. (Overruling People v. Grill, 151 Cal. 592 [91
P. 515].)

APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Contra
Costa County. Wakefield Taylor, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty, reversed.
Benjamin Dreyfus, under appointment by thp. Supreme
Court, and Garry, Dreyfus & McTernan for Defendant and
Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, and Albert 'V. Harris,
Jr., Deputy .Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondcnt.
TRAYNOR, J.-A jury found defendant guilty of murder
of the first degree and fixed the penalty at death. This appeal
is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) In a previous I
trial for the same offense defendant waived trial by jury and'
pleaded guilty to murder, which the court found to bc of the:
first degree. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment. ;
On defendant's appeal the District Court of Appeal reversed'
the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial pursuant to a stipulation of defendant and counsel for dIe respec- ,
tive parties on the ground that defendant was improperly
allowed to withdraw his pIca of not guilty and to enter a
plea of guilty after the court had ordered defendant's counsel discharged on defendant's motion. (Pen. Code, § 1018;
People v. Ballentine, 39 Ca1.2d 193, 196 [246 P.2d 35].)
Defendant admitted in open court that he killed the deceased, Mrs. Joyce Lovett, in a motel in Pinole, and that he
inflicted tIle lacerations and contusions found on her body.
Defendant had previously been casually acquainted with
the deceased and met her in a bar in San Jose on the evening
of JUly 10, 1961. They had a few drinks and the deceased
agreed to accompany defendant on a trip to Lake Tahoe.
They left the bar about closing time and drove to a motel in
EI Cerrito where defendant rcgistered them as ~Ir. and Mrs.
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R. Henderson. The following day they went to two Or threl'
bars in EI Cerrito and San Pablo where each of thl'm drank
!.oleveral beers. In the afternoon thl'Y started toward Sacramento but were forced to stop in Pinole because defendant's
automobile was overheatl'd. They ate and had several more
beers in Pinoll', Defcndant inquired at a bar about motel
accomodations. A customer drove them to a motel on the edge
of town where defendant again registered them as Mr. and
Mrs. Henderson. They arrived at the motel about 4 0 'clock in
the afternoon. About half an hour later defendant killed and
mutilated the deceased. At 10 o'clock that evening a motel
elllployee gave defendant a ride downtown, and defendant
drove his automobile back to the motel. Later that night he
put the deceased's body in his car and after driving around
for several hours put the body along the highway. Defendant
then drove to his apartment in Santa Clara where he stayed
the remaillderof the night. The following day he confessed
the killing to his half-sister and showed her the deceased'sl
rings. After seeing a lawyer in San Jose, he agreed to turn
himself in and at about 8 p.m. surrendered to the Alameda l
County Sheriff.
1
The day after the killing Dr. McNie performed an autopsy!
on the body of the deceased. He testified that death was:
caused by asphyxiation from strangulation associated with:
multiple blunt injuries. Dr. McNie found multiple contusions
on deceased's head, neck, shoulders, arms, and legs. He
found multiple small abrasions on the left breast, multiple
scratches measuring up to two inches in length on the skin of
the lower abdomen, a three-eights inch by one-quarter inch
puncture of the skin over the pubis, and multiple wedgeshaped lacerations of the skin and mucosa of the perineum
radiating outward from the rectum and vagina, the largest of
which was two by one inches extending from the vagina
across the urethra to the clitoris. There was a three-quarter
inch laceration of the rectovaginal septum. There were six to
eight lacerations in the rectal area and the rectum was dilated to 2-1/2 inches in diameter and contained deceased's
wadded panties. It was Dr. McNie's opinion, based on the
finding of hemorrhage into the tissues underlying the injuries, that, except for the perineal area, the injuries had been
inflicted before death. Dr. McNie was not asked whether in
his opinion the injuries to the perineal area occurred before
or after dcath. He testified, however, that there ,vere areas of
hemorrhage into the underlying supporting tissues of the
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rectum and vagina and into the mucosa at the edges of the
laceratiolls. Th('re ,,,as no cvidellce of spcrm in the vaginal
tract. A. blood test disclosed .19 pcr cent alcohol in the
dccC'ased's bloodstream at the time of death.
Based on the condition of the body, the People requested
and the trial court gave instructions defining murder of the
first degree when committed by means of torture and when
committ('d in the perpC'tr!1tiull or attl'liIpt to pC'rpetrate mayhem. The evidence of defC'ndant's possession of the deceased's rings, which the physical evidence suggested had
been removed before death, and his possession of the deceased's purse, support the instruction regarding a killing in
the p('rpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery. The circumstallces of the killing and the existence of fresh scratches
on defendant's face when he was arrested support the instruction that the deceased may have been killed during the
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate rape.
The foregoing eyidence, together with cvidenee tending to
rebut defendant's defense of lack of malicious intent and
premeditation, was the basis for the People's theory that the
killing was murder of the first degree because it was willful,
deliberate, and premeditated. In this r('gard, the man who
drove defendant and the deceased from the bar in Pinole to
the motel testified that defendant did not appear to be intoxicated at that time. The manager of the motel testified that
whcn defendant registered "he had been drinking bnt he
wasn't inebriated." Both of these witnesses were also of the
opinion that the deceased was not intoxicated, although the
blood test disclosed that l1er bloodstream contained .19 per
cent alcohol. To negative lack of criminal intent the People
also offered the testimony of Mrs. Pauline Perez that a month
before the killing defendant had committed a sexual attack
upon her under circumstances similar to those surrounding
the homicide.
Mrs. Perez testified that she met defendant in the same bar
in San Jose in which he later met the deceased and agreed to
have defendant take her home. She testified that defendant
did not take her home and that when she attempted to get
out of his car, he struck her and threatened to kill hcr if she
tried it again. When they stopped, defendant drew a knife
and attempted to rape her and forced her to commit an unnatural act and to submit to the commission of a similar act
by him. She testified that defendant then inserted a sap into
her vagina and bit her arms, legs, breasts, and stomach. He
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threatened to kill her so that she could not report the incident to the police, but relented when she begged for her life.
When defendant allowed her to leave the car, he kept her
underclothes and purse. Mrs. Perez was taken to a hospital
and the police were notified. Photog-mplis of Mrs. Perez's injuries wcre introduced by the People to explain and corroborate her testimony. Defendant admitted on the stand that he
performed the acts testified to by Mrs. Perez, but denied that
he had a knife or that he threatened to kill her. He also
denied that he threatened to kill her because shc had informed on him.
Defendant does not contend that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of first degree murder under
any or all of the theories adyanced by the People. His defense is that he had no intent to harm the deceased and that
he had no control oyer his actions because of his intoxication i
and mental illness not amounting to lcgal insanity. He testified that the mutilation of the deceased occurred after he had
killed her by strangulation. He could not recall when or how
he received the scratches on his face and denied that he attempted to rape the deceased or to force her to engage in any
unnatural act. He testified that he took the rings from her
finger after he had put the body along the highway, but he
did not know why he had taken them. He did not explain his
possession of the deceased's purse.
In support of his defense of intoxication, defendant testified that he drank 13 to 15 beers at various bars on the day of
the killing and that he was drunk when he and the deceased
arrived at the motel. He testified that after checking into the
motel the deceased took a shower and as she was drying
herself he walked into the bathroom, picked her up and carried her into the bedroom. He "laid her down 011 the bed,
and then ... started to make love to her and then this strange
thing come" that he described as "like watching ... yourself
do something and yet unable to intercede or to stop whatever
is happening .... [Y] ou seem to be paralyzed and I could see
everything was going on and, to put it bluntly, just like a
dream." Defendant testified that he strangled the deceased
with his hands but that before killing her he did not hit or
cut her or do any other violence to her body. He testified that
after he had killed her he"woke" or "came out" and
realized what he had done. He carricd her body into thc
shower and attempted to revive her with cold watcr. "And
then I says, 'If she's as dead as she appears, who will believe
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mef' So that's when I got the crazy notion and did what the
other I did." Defendant testified that he went into the bathroom where the body was lying in a corner of the shower
stall and cut the deceased's body with a beer can opener.
Defendant then "passed out" on the bed. When he awoke,
he dressed the body and left it leaning against the wall in the
bathroom. About midnight he carried the body to his car and
disposed of it along the highway.
This version of the killing and mutilation was substantially the same as that told to the various psychiatrists who
testified at the trial. Defendant's half-sister, to whom d<,fendant confessed the crime before surrendering to the sheriff, testified that he told her that he "got a pain ... down
here in the lower part, and it hurt, you know. Got a lot of
pain and it made him black out like, and when he came to, he
had a can opener in his hand and he went in [to the bathroom] ... and he looked at her and he realized he strangled
her and cut her up from the bottom part with the can opener
to the belly button.... [A]nd then he told me how he did it.
He said that he went into the bathroom and he says he don't
remember doing it, but he knows he did it. He said that he
went into the bathroom and strangled her and then he-he
didn't remember how he cut her up. He just cut her up.
That's all. And then when he woke up on the bed, the pain
was gone away, he said. That he woke up and he found the
can opener in his hand .... "
Two psychiatrists testified that because of defendant's
mental state he did not premeditate before the killing. Dr ..
Wilcox's report, which was admitted into evid<'nee, stated
that" I feel that this man is a borderline schizophrenic ....
Despite the appearance of fairly good integration in most
areas of the personality, there are many evidences of psychotic thinking. It seems to me that the murder grew directly
out of his illness. The murder appeared to be an expression
of his hate for women and society; also his hate for himself ..
. . I feel that Mr. Henderson is psychotic and that he also is
legally insane. I feel that he was insane at the time of the
murder." Although Dr. Wilcox was unsure whether defendant could premeditate at the time of the killing, it was his
opinion that defendant did not premeditate. Dr. Adams was
of the opinion that at the time of the killing defendant was
not capable of killing the deceased with premeditation. He
testificd that in light of defendant's background he was
suffering from a "severe psychologic problem ... not in a
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psychotic or insane sense, but rather in the sense of a flood of
emotion which has a dynamic interpretation in the background, I am sure, connected somewhere with his mother, but
in any event, leading to an emotional upheaval and always in
a sexual setting over which he did not have voluntary control. Therefore, I say that at the time this happened, he was
again, in my opinion, a victim of this flood of emotion to the
extent that he was unable to utilize normal volitional control
over his actions. ' ,
On cross-examination, both Dr. Wilcox and Dr. Adams
stated that they based their opinions on what defendant had
told them and that if the actual facts differed from defendant's statement of them their opinions would be different.
Dr. Wilcox stated that he would question his conclusion that
defendant did not premcditate if the sequence of the killing
and the mutilation were reversed, as the testimony of the
autopsy surgeon suggested. In response to a hypothetical
question he stated that defendant was able to premeditate
during the Perez incident.
In rebuttal, the People introduced the testimony of three
psychiatrists who had examined defendant and concluded
that he was not suffering from any mental defect that would
preclude his acting with malice aforethought and premeditation when he killed the deceased. Dr. Rapaport testifled that
"at the time of this alleged offense, he was conscious and
aware of what he was doing.... He had no mental illness ...
that would have precluded him from forming intent or en- ,
gage in premeditation." Dr. Argens found "no evidence of ~
mental illness as such would preclude [defendant's] ... normal actions or ordinary actions .... [He found J no evidence
at all of psychosis." Dr. Fort, who examined defendant on
the day after the killing, testified that at the time of the
homicide defendant "was conscious and ,vas not suffering
from any form of mental illness or emotional disturbance
that would have interfered with his capacity to premeditate."
[1a] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
failing on its own motion to instruct the jury on the le~al
significance of the evidence of defendant's mental illness and
in refusing to give defendant's proffered instruction on manslaughter.
[2] "It would seem elementary that a plea of not guilty
to a charge of murder puts in issue the existence of thc
particular mental states which are essential elements of the
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two degrees of murder and of manslaughter .... Aeeordingly,
it appears only fair and reasonable that defendant should be
allowed to show that in faet, subjectively, he did Hot POSSl'SS
the mental state or states in issue." (People v. Gorshell, 51
Ca1.2d 716, 733 [336 P.2d 492] ; People v. lV ells, 33 Ca1.2d
330, 343-357 [202 P.2d 53).)
[3] " 'It is elementary that the court should instruct the
jury upon every material question upon which there is allY
evidence deserving of any consideration whatever . . . . [4]
The fact that the evidence may not be of a character to
inspire belief docs not authorize the refusal of an illStl'llction
based thereon .... Tltat is a question within the exclusive
province of the jltry. However incredible the testimony of a
defendant m,ay be he is entitled to an instruction based 11pon
the hypothesis that it is entirely true.'" (People v. Carmen,
36 Ca1.2d 768, 773 [228 P.2d 281].)
[lb] The People do not disputc these settled propositions
of law that under a general plea to the charge of murder,
evidence is admissible tending to establish a defense negating
the specific mental states essential to the crime and that ,,,hen
such evidence is received, the defendant is entitled to an
instruction apprising the jury of its significance. The People
contend, however, that the trial court is not required to give
such an instruction on its own motion. They argue that "The
cases which have found a duty on the court to give sua
sponte instructions have generally involved situations "'herc
tIle failure to give the instructions had the C'i'fect of removing
from the jury a significant issue in the trial and thus failing
to give to the defendant an opportunity ... to obtain a. determination by the jury of the particular issue." 'Ve think that
this is such a case.
[5] It can no longer be doubted that the defense of mental illness not amounting to legal insanity is a "signifiC'ant
issue" in any ease in which it is raised by substantial evidence. Its purpose and effect are to ameliorate the law ~ov
ernillg criminal responsibility prescribed by the M 'Naughton
rule. (See Lindman & McIntyre, The Mentally Disabled and
the Law (1961) 355-356.) under that rule a defendant is not
insane in the eyes of the law if at the time of the crime he
knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. [6] Fnder
the ll' ells-Gorshcn rule of diminished r('!;ponsihili ty ('\,('n
though a defendant be legally sane according to the M'Naughton test, if he was suffering from a mental illn('~s that
prevented his acting with malice aforethought or with premeditation and deliberation, he cannot be convicted of mur-
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der of the first degree. This policy is now firmly establisllccl
in the law of California (People v. Oorslten, supra; People v.
Rah'r, 42 Ca1.2d 550, 569-571 [268 P.2d 705J; People v.Sanchez, 35 Ca1.2d 522, 526-529 [219 P.2d 9J; People v. Wells,
supra; People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 683-684) and where,
as here. substantial evidence sufficient to inform the court
that !lefelldallt is relying upon th~ defense of diminisheJ responsibility is received, it must on its own motion instruct
the jury as to the legal significance of such evidence, for
such an instruction is "necessary for the jury to be fully and
fairly cllarged upon the relevant law." (People v. Jackson,
59 Cal.2d 375, 380 [2!) Cal.Rptr. 505, 379 P.2d 937], alld
cases cited therein.)
[1e] The People contend that the failure to instruct on
diminished responsibility was not prejudicial because the illtent and state of mind of defendant were fully deY(~loped by
argument of counsel and were adequately covered by the
instructions given. It is true that from the opening statement
of counsel for the defense the issue of defendant's mental
state at the time of the homicide was in issue. Defense counsel stated that he expected the evidence would show "exactly
what the District Attorney said, that this was a sadistic murder." He added that he expected to prove from medical
experts "that Mr. Henderson was suffering from SUCll a psychosis or ... illness that he ... did not have tIle mind or the
capability of forming a malicious or a prem('ditated [intent]
.... " During his argument to the jury, the prosecutor referred to the psyclliatl'ic testimony and stated" this really is
the defellse of the defendant here: his inability to premeditat<', his lack of intent." In closing argument, defense COUllsel urged the jury to "examine carefully what the psychiatrists have told you and what they have testified to, and I
tllink ... that you will agl'ce with me that this was a heinous
crime. I don't argue that .... [B] ut I say to you it wasn't
premeditated." He argued "in closing ... the only issue in
this case is the premeditation and the intent.... I do not
excuse nor condone Mr. Henderson, but I say to you he is
guilty of nothing greater than murder in the second degree. . . . "
We agree that in light of such extensive argument on the
issue of defendant's responsibility he could not have been
harmed by the failure to instruct on that issue if the jury
was otherwise properly illstructed on intent. The jury, however, was not properly instructed on that issue. It ,vas in-
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structed that to constitute willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder the killing must bc accompanied by a clear intent
to take life resulting from deliberation and formed upon a
preexisting reflection and not in heat of anger, and that the
slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and
the reasons for and against such choice and, having in mind
the consequences, decide to and commit the unlawful act
causing death. These instructions were proper, but they in-formed the jury only that a particular intent was necessary.
How the jury should discover whether that intent existed
was covered by the following instruction: "The intent or
intention is manifested by the circumstances connected with
the offense and the sound mind and discretion of the aceused,
and I further instruct you that all persons are of sound mind
who are neither idiots nor lunatics nor affected with insanity
to such an extent as to be unable to discern right from
wrong."
Although counsel argued and the court instructed that defendant's intent was the crucial issue in the case, the only
instruction that purported to tell the jury how to determine
what that intent was told them to look to the circumstances
of the offense and defendant's ,. sound mind" unless they
found him to be an idiot, lunatic or legally insane.
"The prejudicial nature of the instruction appears most
clearly in the difficulties that it creates for the jury in the
application of the rule ... that evidence of a mental infirmity, not amounting to legal insanity, is admissible and should
be considered by the jury on the questions of premeditation
and deliberation. If the defendant has a 'sound mind,' that
is 'a healthy and robust mind, neither diseased nor injured,'
it necessarily follows that he would not have a mental infirmity making him incapable of premeditating or deliberating."
(People v. Baker, 42 Ca1.2d 550,569 (268 P.2d 705].)
Defendant admitted that he killed and mutilated the deceased. These were the major "circumstances connected with
the offense" from which the jury was instructed it could
infer defendant's intent. His sole defense was diminished
responsibility because of his "unsound" though not insane
mind, and this defense was withdrawn from the jury by the
court's instruction that defendant was of sound mind if he
was not all idiot, lunatic or legally insane. There could be no
question of defendant's legal insanity during the trial of his
guilt or innocence since that issue was to be determined on
the separate proceeding under his plea of not guilty by rea-
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son of insanity, which was not withdrawn until the conclusion of the trial on the issue of guilt. Under these circumstances, defendant is "conclusively presumed to have been
sane at the time the offense is alleged to have been commit·
ted." (Pen. Code, § 1026.) There was no evidence that defendant was a lunatic or an idiot within the ordinary meaning of those words. Based on the only criteria it was given,
the jury could only have found that defendant was of
"sound mind." The effect of the instruction that defendant
was of sound mind together with the failure to instruct on
the significance of his defense of diminished responsibility
was to withdraw from the jury all consideration of the evidence introduced in support of that defense. Such evidence,
although disputed, was considerable. There was no evidence
that defendant intended to kill the deceased at any time
before rcgistering at the motel, and the autopsy surgeon's
report and defendant's testimony agree that death occurred
shortly thereafter. That defendant theretofore had no pre-'
meditated intent to kill is attested to by the prosecution wit-.
nesses who testified as to the conduct of defendant and the 1
deceased at every point between their meeting in San Jose
and the motel in Pinole. Although the half hour that elapsed
between the registering and the killing was sufficient for defendant to form a willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to kill, the evidence does not compel that conclusion.
Although the circumstances of the killing and the condition
of the deceased's body would warrant a conclusion that the
killing was premeditated, they also suggest that the perpetrator of such a killing and mutilation was deranged. Defendant
testified that he had no intention to kill the deceased and·
that the act was done while he was in a dream-like state. Two
psychiatrists testified in corroboration of this explanation of
the killing. We do not overlook the testimony of the autopsy
surgeon that the mutilation occurred before the killing, and
we are aware of the damaging effect of this testimony, if
true, upon defendant's defense. That testimony, however, is
not without equivocation. Dr. McNie consistently responded
to questions regarding the relationship of the wounds to
death by stating that he "felt" that thcy were inflicted
before death. The jury was instructed that it could disregard
or give such weight as it thought warranted to expert testimony. Accordingly, it was entitled to disregard an expert's
"fecling" concerning evidence within his competcnce to interpret. It follows that the jury could have concluded that
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defendant was telling the truth about the sequence of events
aud his intent at the time they occurred. It could have concluded that defendant's experts were not discredited on. the
g'l'olmd that their opinions were based on an erroncous view
of the circumstances. If the jury so concluded, it could not
have found defendant guilty of murder in the commission of
mayhem or by torture. The evidence that defendant killed
during the course of rape or an attempt to rape was wholly
circumstantial and inconsistent with the evidence that deceased willingly accompanied defendant to the motel and willingly engaged in sexual intercourse with him during their
stay in the first motel. Although defendant had deceased's
rings and purse in his possession after the killing, tllat was
the only evidence that the deceased was killed during the
course of a robbery. There is no evidcnce tllat if an intent to
take her property existed, it arose before the completion of
the homicide. The vice of the instruction is that even if the
jury found no murder by torture or killing during the course
of mayhem, rape, or robbery, it was barred fro111 considering
defendant's sole defense of diminished responsibility by the
court's direction that defendant was of "sound mind." The
error was aggravated by the court's failure to give any instruction that told the jury for what purpose they could
consider the evidenee of that defense.
Since defendant was deprived of the right to a jury determination of the only real issue in the case, the cOllviction
must be reversed, for the denial of such a right itself is a
miscarriage of justice within the meaning of article VI, section 41;2, of the Constitution. (People v. JIcI(ay, 37 Ca1.2d .
792, 798 [236 P.2d 145] ; People v. Sarazzawski, 27 Ca1.2d 7;
11 [161 P.2d 934] ; People v. Mahoney, 201 Cal. 618, 627 [258
P.607].)
Since the judgment must be reversed, we shall consider
other contentions that may arise on retrial.
[7a] Defendant's contention that the trial court erred in
admitting into evidence over objection the testimony of Mrs.
Pauline Perez that defendant had attacked ller sexually a
month before the killing is devoid of merit. It was clearly
admissible to prove, as the jury was instructed, dcfpndant's
motive for killing the deceased and the intent with which the
act was done. [8] "It is settled in this state that except
when it shows merely criminal disposition, evidence which
tends logically and by reasonable inference to establish any
fact material for the prosecution, or to overcome any material
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fact sought to be pro.... ed by the defense, is admissible although it may connect the accused with an offense not included in the charge." (People Y. Woods, 35 Ca1.2d 504, 50!)
[218 P.2d 981]; People Y. Weitz, 42 Ca1.2d 338, 347 [267
P.2d 295].) The evidence was relevant on the issues for
which it was received. [9] Although evidence of prior offenses carries with it the risk that its probative value may be
()utwcig-hed by its pos-.;iule prcjmlicial effect, evaluation of
this risk rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.
(People v. McCaughan, 49 Ca1.2d 409, 421-422 [317 P.2rl
974].) [7b]
We find no abuse of discretion in the admission of Mrs. Perez's testilllony.
[lOa] Defendant also eontencls that the trial court erred
in adlllitting photographs of Mrs. Perez's injuries, on tl]('
ground that they served solely to inflallle the jury. [11]
When allegedly inflammatory photographs are presented, the
trial court must determine their admissiblity in light of their
probative value, other evidence on the issue, and their possible prejudice to the defendant. (People v. Love, 53 Ca1.2d
843, 852 [3 Cal.Rptr. 6G5, 350 P.2d 705] ; People v. Atchley,
53 Ca1.2d 160, 168 [34G P.2d 764]; People v. Brubaker, 53
Ca1.2d 37, 48 [346 P.2d 8].) [lOb] We find no abuse of'
discretion in the adlllission of the photographs.
[12] Defendant contl'llds that the prohibition against
double jeopardy precludes imposing the death sentence after
reversal of the first judgment sentt'l1cing him to life imprisonment. Article I, section 13, of the California Constitution
provides that" No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense .... " It states a fundamental principle limiting the state's right repeatedly to prosecute a defendant. It
is not an absolute prohibition, for although jeopardy may
have attached, legal necessity or the real or implied consent
of the defendant permits a retrial. (Paulson v. Superior
Court, 58 Ca1.2d 1, 5 [22 Cal.Hptr. 64!J, 372 P.2d 641], and
cases cited.) III the present case, we must determine the extent to which a defelldallt \\"ho attacks un errolleous conviction
thereby opens the door to beillg again placed in jeopardy.
He does not gain immunity, for by successfully attacking
the judgment he at least subjects himself to a retrial that
may reach the same rt'sult. (United States v. Ball, 163 U.S.
662, 672 [16 S.Ct. 1 H12, 41 L.Ed. 3OD, 303] ; People v. Green,
47 Ca1.2d 209, 23~ [:302 P.2d 3071.) There is a sharp conflict
in the cases, howevcr. whether suell an attack opens the door
to the imposition of a more seyere sentence on retrial. (See
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cases collected in 61 A.L.R.2d 1141-1216.) The question usually al'ises when a defendant has successfully attacked a conviction of a lesser included offense or a cOllviction of a lower
degree of the crime chargcd.
Before this court's decision in Gomez v. Superior Court, 50
Cal.2d 640 [328 P.2d 976], there was a curious distinction
betwe<.'n a conviction of a lesser included offense and a conviction of a lesser degree of a crime divided into degrees.
A conviction of a lesser included offense was deemed a final
acquittal of the offense charged, which was not affected by a
subsequent reversal of the conviction. (In re Hess, 45 Ca1.2<l
171, 176 [288 P.2d 5], and cases cited.) A conviction of the
lesser degree of a crime divided into degrees was not deemcd
an acquittal of guilt of the higher degree, and after reversal
the defendant could be convicted of the higher degree on
retrial. (People v. Keefer, 65 Cal. 232, 235 [3 P. 818] ; People
v. McNcer, 14 Cal.App.2d 22, 30 [57 P.2d 1018].) In the
Gomez case, however, we found this distinction to bc logically
indefensible and held that the double jeopardy clause precluded convicting a defendant of a higher degree of a crime
after he had secured reversal of his conviction of the lower
degree. In Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 [78 S.Ot. 221,
2 L.Ed.2d 199, 61. A.L.R.2d 1119], the United States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion with regard to a
conviction of first degree murder after reversal of a conviction of second degree murder. In holding that a defendant is
not required to elect between suffering an erroneous conviction to stand unchallenged and appealing therefrom at the
cost of forfeiting a valid defense to the greater offensc, we
agreed with the reasoning in the Green case, that '" a
defendant faced with such a "choice" takes a "desperate
chance" in securing the reversal of the erroneous conviction.
The law should not, and in our judgment does not, place the
defendant in such an incredible dilemma.''' (Gomez v.
Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 640, 651-652 [328 P.2d 976].) This
reasoning applies with equal force to the present case.
The A ttorney General contends, however, that under the
double jeopardy clause in the United States Constitution and
the California Constitution the death penalty can be imposed
on a conviction of firf>t degree murder following reversal of a
convictioll for the same offense with punishment fixed at life
imprif>ollment. (Stroud v. United Stutes, 251 U.S. 15, 18 [40
S.Ct. 50, 64 L.Ed. 103, 110] ; People v. Grill, 151 Cal. 592,
598 [91 P. 515] ; see also, State v. Knccskern, 303 Iowa 929
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[210 N.W. 465, 473] ; Stafe v. Morgan, 145 La. 585 [82 So.
711, 719] ; Mann v. State, 23 Fla. 610 [3 So. 207, 211] ; Greer
v. State, 62 Tenn. (3 Baxt.) 321, 323-325.) When Stroud v.
United States and People v. Grill were decided, it had been
held by the United States Supreme Court and by this court
that a reversed conviction of a lesser degree of a crime did
not preclude conviction of the higher degree on retrial.
(Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 533-534 [26 S.Ct. 121,
50 h.Ed. 292, 296-297] ; People v. Keefer, 65 Cal. 232, 235 [3
P. 818].) A fortiori that rule would apply to different punishments for the same crime. Since the Green and Gomez
cases have now cstablished that a reversed conviction of a
lesser degree of a crime precludes conviction of a higher degree on retrial, the rationale of the Stroud and Grill cases has
been vitiated. It is immaterial to the basic purpose of the
constitutional provision against double jeopardy whether the
Legislature divides a crime into different degrees carrying
different punishments or allows the court or jury to fix
different punishments for the same crime. Thus, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter dissented in the Green case arguing that the
Court's decision in Stroud v. United States, supra, controlled the decision: ".\s a practical matter, and on any basis
of human values, it is scarcely possible to distinguish a case
in which the defendant is convicted of a greater offense from
the one in which he is convicted of an offense that has the
same name as that of which he was previously convieted but
carries a significantly different pUllishment, namely death
rather than imprisonment." (355 U.S. 184, 198 at p. 213 [2
L.Ed.2d 199, 210 at p. 219, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119, 1130 at p. 1138 J.)
Agrceing with ~lr. Justice Frankfurter's reasoning, we overrule People v. Grill, 151 Cal.592 [91 P. 515]. A defendant's
right of appeal from an erroneous judgment is unreasonably
impaired when he is required to risk his life to invoke that
right. Since the state has no interest in preserving erroneous
judgmellts, it has no interest in foreclosing appeals there.
from by imposing nnreasonable conditions on the right to
appeal.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., concurred.
SCHACER, J.-Jn dissellting J stress above all other con·
siderations, however seriuus they are, my objections to the
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majority's hohlill:£ ~(/lIfr, pp. -l:);) - -lui) that the prohibition
again:;t double jeoparuy (Cal. COllst., art. I, § 13; Pen. Coue,
§§ 687, 1023) forbids tile trier of fact to impose a death
sentence on a defendallt cOll\'icted on retrial of first degree
murder after reversal on appeaP of a judgment sentencing
him to life imprisonment for the same offense, following his
previous waiver of jury trial and plea of guilty. The rcc~ r<l
of the second trial is replete with evidence, material to both
guilt and penalty, which II ad not been adduced at the first
proceeding because of such waiver and plea.
The subject majority ruling is wholly without support ill
the decisions of this or any other court, and indeed is directly contrary to the llOldings of the United States Supreme
Court (Stroud v. United States (1919) 251 U.S. 15, 18 [40
S.Ct. 50, 64 L.Ed. 103, 110]; see also Murphy v. Massachu- !
setts (1900) 177 U.S. 155 [20 S.Ct. 639, 44 L.Ed. 711]) and:
of every state court (including the Supreme Court of Cali- :
fornia) that has had occasion to rule on the matter (People i
v. Grill (1907) 151 Cal. 592, 598 [91 P. 515] ; State v. Knceskern (1926) 303 Iowa 929 [210 N.W. 465] ; State v. Morgan
(1!Jl9) 14;) La. 58.3 [82 So. 711] ; Jiann v. State (1887) 23
PIa. 610 [3 So. 207J; Greer v. State (1874) 62 Tenn. (:3
Buxt.) 321). ~\s will hereinafter be shown, the latter hohljll~s remain good law and have not been "vitiated" (as the
majority argue) by subsequent decision on essentially distinguishable issues.
'flll're is no doubt, as the majority acknowledge (ante, p.
4!l;», that after rewrsal on appeal the prollibition against·
double jeopardy does not prevent a retrial whereby the
defendant can legally be cOllvicted of the same offense as that
of which he ,vas originally found guilty. Penal Code seetioll
1180 specifics that "The granting of a new trial places t!,(,
parties in the same position as if no trial had been had. All
thE' testimony must be produced anew, and the former verdict
or finding cannot be used or referred to, either in evidence or
ill argument, or be pleaded in bar of any conviction which
might have been had under the accusatory pleading." Thl!!;
there will be a retrial in the case at bench (§ 1262), and
upon such trial defendant can again be convicted of mnrdl'r
in the first degree. (United States v. Ball (1896) 163 U.S.
1 Here the re"ersal was by stipulation of the parties, signed by the
defl'n<iant, uy his nttortlcy, and hy the Attorney General. The 11JIUSII:11
circumstances (contrived by defcnuant) which led to its execution are
hcreillaftcl' u"!i/ll'atl"!.
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662, 672 [16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300].) If he sllOuld be so
convicted, it would be thc statutory duty of the trial court to
comply with Penal Code section 190, which prescribes that
,. Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall
suffer death, or confinement in the state prison for life, at the
discretion of the court or jury trying the same, and the matter of punishment shall be determined as provided in scction
190.1 . . . . " (Italics addC'd.) The latter section declares ill
relevant part that "If such person has been found guilty of
an offense punisllable by life imprisonment or death, .•. there
shall thereupon be further proceedings on the issue of penalty, and the trier of fact shall fix the penalty.... The determination of the penalty of life imprisonment or death shall
be in the discretion of the court or jury trying the issue of
fact on the evidence presented .... " But under the present
ruling of the majority the trier of fact will actually have no
discretion in such proceedings other than to fix tIle punishment at life imprisonment. Indeed, even if wholly different
evidence were to be introduced on the retrial of the penalty
issue,!! the trier of fact cOllld give no cffect to sllch cl'idence
but would be mechanically bound by thc finding made on other
evidence and by a different trier of fact in the first proceeding.
The subject holding thus amounts to a judicial aborgation of I
the releyant portions of Penal Code sections 190 and 190.1: In I
cases such as the one before us it will be futile to comply .
with the statutory command that "there shall thereupon be ;
further proceedings on the issue of penalty," as the determination of that issue will no longer "be in the discretion of
the court or jury trying the issue of fact on the evidence·'
presented" (Pen. Code, § 190.1).
Analysis discloses only two arguments that can conceivably
be advanced in support of today's majority holding on double jeopardy: i.e., either (1) the prohibition against double
jeopardy applies because in the first penalty trialS the trier
of fact impliedly II acquitted" defendant of that "degree"
of first degree murder that warrants the death penalty, by
!!Ucre, ns hns bcen already mentioned, the record on the retrial-the
only trial where guilt was at issue-is replete with evidence, material to
both guilt and penalty, whieh had not bcen audnceJ at the first procced·
ing because of defendant's waiver of jury trial and plea of guilty.
sIt ean only be on tbe first penalty trial thnt the majority hold
defendant was .. acquitted" of the type of first degree murder that
warrants the death penalty, because defenuant pleaded guilty to the
charge aa laid.
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finding him "guilty" of another "degree" of first degree
murder that warrants only life imprisonment; or (2) the
prohibition against double jeopardy relates not only to the
offense of which the defendant was "acquitted" but also the
.' punishment imposed for the offense of which he was convic: ted (and for which he can be retried). Each of these arguments, as will be shown in turn, is an absurdity.
The first argument has nowhere been better stated than by
this court in People v. Grill (1907) supra, 151 Cal. 592, 598:
"It is now claimed that where there is a charge of murder of
the first degree and a conviction of murder of the first degree
with the penalty of imprisonment for life such judgment is a
virtual acquittal of the character of murder sufficiently atrocious to justify the death penalty and is a bar to the infliction of the death penalty upon a retrial of the same charge."
The argument thus assumes that there are two "degrees" or
grades of first degree murder, one being "sufficiently atrocious to justify the death penalty" and the other being,
presumably, not "sufficiently atrocious." A complete refutation of this argument and its assumption is set forth in Grill
(ibid.), as follows: "The discretion given to the jury to mitigate the punishment upon a conviction of murder in the first
degree, and inflict imprisonment for life only, does not, after
such a verdict, divide that degree of murder into two degrees,
but merely reduces the punishment. The mere substitution of
imprisonment for life for the death penalty is not a determination that any element of murder of the first degree is
lacking. On the contrary, such a verdict eannot be given until
all the facts necessary to constitute that degree of murder are
established. The former conviction was not an acquittal of
the first degree of murder nor of any degree thereof."
(Italics added.) Likewise, the United States Supreme Court
observed in Stroud v. United States (1919) supra, 251 U.S.
15, 18 [40 S.Ct. 50, 64 L.Ed. 103, 110], that" The fact that
the jury may thus mitigate the punishment to imprisonment
for life did not render the conviction less than one for first
degree murder. "
The majority seek to circumvent the holdings of Stroud
and Grill by asserting (ante, p. 497) that "Since the Green
[Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184 (78 S. Ct. 221,
2 L.Ed.2d 199, 61 A.L.R.2d 119)] and Gomez [Gomez v.
Superior Court (1958) 50 Cal.2d 640 (328 P.2d 976)] cases
have now established that a reversed conviction of a lesser
degree of a crime precludes conviction of a higher de-
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gree on retrial, the rationale of the Stroud and Grill cases
has been vitiated." (Italics addl'd.) That tlle emphasized
language is a total 11011 sequitur appears from the face of the
opinions themselves. Both Green and Gomez dealt with the
problem of whether the prohibition against double jeopardy
precludes retrial for a higher degree of an offense after reversal of a conviction of a lower degree. In the case at bench,
by contrast, defendant has been convicted of only one offense,
first degree murder; as just explained, the jury's determination of penalty (or the court's determination as in the first
trial here) does not divide first degree murder into two further IC degrees" or grades.
It is true that in Grill (at p. 598 of 151 Cal.) this court
adverted in passing to the fact that (as of that date) "It has
been held that a conviction of murder of the sccond degree
upon the trial of a charge of murder of the first degree is no
bar to a subsequent conviction of the higher degree upon a
retrial of the same case granted upon defendant's motion,"
citing inter alia People v. Keefer (1884) 65 Cal. 232, 235 [3
P. 818]. But the court then observed, "Upon this exact point
we need express no opinion," and immediately went on to
dispose of the issue of double jeopardy on the unrelated but
wholly adequate rationale quoted hereinabove. The Keefer
rule was abandoned in Gomez; but since that rule was unnecessary to the decision in Grill-and reliance thereon was expressly disavowed in the above quoted language of the Grill
opinion-it is manifest that Gomez neither overruled Grill by
implication nor in any way "vitiated" its true rationale.
Similarly, it is manifest that the rationale of Stroud was·
not "vitiated" by the decision in Green. While the Green
case cast doubt upon Trona v. United States (1905) 199 U.S.
521 [26 S.Ct. 121, 50 L.Ec. 292], cited in Stroud, the court
in Green nevertheless took pains to declare (at p. 195, fn. 15,
of 355 U.S. [2 L.Ed.2d at p. 208, 61 A.L.R.2d at p. 1128] :
"Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 [40 S.Ct. 50, 64 L.Ed.
103], is clearly distinguisllable. In that case [as in the case at
bench] a defendant was retried for first degree murder after
he had successfully asked an appellate court to set aside a
prior conviction for that same offense." It appears to me
somewhat presumptuous for the majority of this court to
assert that Stroud was "vitiated" by Green when the
United States Supreme Court itself states in the latter deci-
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sion that Stroud" is cleady distinguishable.' 'f
This brings me to the second possible argument in support
of the majority's holding-i.e., that the prohibition against
double jeopardy relates also to the punishmcnt imposed for
the offense of which the defendant was convicted (and for
which, after reversal on appeal, he can be retried). Ignoring
the lines drawn by the high court in G"cen, the majority
further assert (ante, p. 497) that" It is immaterial to the
basic purpose of the constitutional provision against double
jeopardy whether the Legislature divides a crime into different degrees carrying different punishments or allows the
court or jury to fix different punishments for the same
crime." No authority is cited for this sweeping statement,
nor can any be found. It represents a misreading or disregard of both Green and Gomcz, which stand for the basic
proposition that under the law of double jeopardy a defendant cannot be said to have waived his implied acquittal on
one offense in order to exercise his right to appeal from his
conviction on another offense, regardlcss of 1vhether the di.~
tinction bctwcen the offenses as set forth in the penal statutes
is expressed by means of different names (e.g., manslaughter
and murder) or by means of different degrees of a crime
bearing one name (e.g., first degree murder and second degree murder). The fallacy inherent in the majority's attempted analogy is simple. It overlooks the fundamental principle that even though different degrf'es of a crime may refer
to a common name (e.g., murder), each of those clcgrecs -is in
fact a different offense, requiring proof of different elements
for conviction. This truth ,vas well grasped by the court in
. fIt is also a quite novel claim of precedent for the majority to
"agree with" :MI". Justi('e Frankfurter's afl;ulllC'llt on this point (ante,
p. 49i) while at the same time rejecting in effect the entire substance of
his dissenting opinion, in which he was joined by three other membel's of
the high eourt (355 U.S. at pp. 198·219 [2 L.Ed.2d at pp. 210·222, 61
A.L.R.:!d at p. 1128]). It is noteworthy, for example, tllat tile majority
do not choose to quote tile following passage from Justice Frankfurter's
opinion: "\Yc should not be so unmindful, even when constitutional
questions are involved, of the principle of stare decisis, by whose circumspect observance the wisdolll of this Court as an institution trans('ending the moment can alone be brought to bear on the difiicult problems that confront us... , l W]e are not here called upon to weigh
considerations generated by changing concepts as to minimum standards
of fairness, which interpretation of the Due Process Clause inevitably
requires. Instead, tile defense of double jeopardy is involved, whose
("ontollrs arc the PI'Otillct. of history." (3.',j U.S. at p. 215 [2 L.Ed.2d at
p. 220, 61 A.L.R.2d at pp. 1138, 1139].)
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Gomez (at p. 645 [2] of 50 Ca1.2d), where it was statl'u that
"The elements necessary for first degree murder differ from
those of second degree murder .... A jury implil'dly ul'citL's
that the necessary element of the greater crime i!'l lacking
under the evidence and returns a verdict fin(ling the defendant guilty of the lesser degree." And given the fact that 1
different degrees constitute different offenses, it is not suprising that they carry different punishments. The majority's
emphasis on such difference in punishments is, therefore,'
both misleading and without substance.
Moreover, contrary to the majority's assertion, the authorities demonstrate that the distinction between degrees of
crime and difference in punishment is not "immaterial to the
basic purpose of the constitutional provision against doubl('
jeopardy!' Although the majority do not rl'state that "bas',·
purpose," I assume it to be as set forth ill Gomez (at p. G-J·l
{2] of 50 Ca1.2d, quoting from Green v. United States (l!J::i7)
sltpra, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 [78 S.Ot. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199,
204, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119, 1124]): "The underlying idea, one
that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-A mericall
system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individuaZ for an alhoed ofJrnse.
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a continuing statf! of anxiet~·
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty." (Italics auded.)
The limitation of the protection to repeated trials for "the
same offense" is not accidental; it is obedient to the expres>i
language of the constitutional and statutory mandates. Tlms
the Fifth Amendment to the Uniteu States Constitution declares that "No perSOll shall ... be subject for the same
offence to be twice put ill jeopardy of life or limb." Article
I, section 13, of the California Constitution likewise provides
that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the sa'me
offense." And the Penal Codc sections which restate and
implement the constitutional command (§ § 687, 1023) arc
also phrased in terms of jeopardy for the Mille "offrllse."
(See also Pen. Codr, §§ !Ja9. 102~, 1887.)
Under the forpgoing provisions this court has ronsistently
held that the prohibition agaillst double jpopardy dors 110t
apply to the issne of puni.shmcllt. Thus ill reYl'r:;in;! a jndg.
ment of denth illsofal' as it rplllt('(l to the question of IWllalt.,·
we held (['cople v. Green (1956) 47 Ca1.2d 209, 235 [11J
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[302 P.2d 307] tIl at "Inasmuch as the original sentence is
set asidc at tllC behest of the defendant it cannot be successfully pleaded as constituting former jcopardy and there is no
denial of due process. [Citations.]" (Accord, People v.
Hooton (1959) 53 CaI.2d 85, 88 [3]-89 [4] [346 P.2d 199].)
As the United States Supreme Court declared in the leading
case of United States v. Ball (1896) 163 U.S. 662, 669 [16
S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 3001 (cited in the majority opinion
ante, at p. 4(5) : "The prohibition is not against being twice
punished, II but against being twice put in jeopardy; ... "
That same court has held, more particularly, that a defendant is not twice put in jeopardy when, after reversal of his
sentence on an appeal taken by him, his punishment is increased for the same offense. (Murphy v. Massachusetts
(1900) 177 U.S. 155 [20 S.Ct. 639, 44 L.Ed. 711] [affirming
judgment which increased defendant's minimum sentence,
after appeal, from 10 Yl'ars to 12% years imprisonment].)
Lest it be thought that Green v. United States (1957) I
supra, 355 U.S. 184 [78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 61 A.L.R.2d I
1119], has necessarily "vitiated" the holding in Murphy as
well, it is appropriate to consider two recent decisions of
distinguished state courts on this issue, each postdating
Green by some five years. In Hicks v. Commonwealth (1962)
(Mass.) 185 N.E.2d 739, the defendant pleaded guilty to
four indictments of armed robbery and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 15 to 20 years imprisonment on each indiGtment. The defendant appealed, exercising his statutory right
to a review of the sentences (Mass. Gen. Laws, eh. 278,
§§ 28A-28D). The Appellate Division, after hearing, ordered
the defendant's sentences increased to concurrent terms of
20 to 25 years imprisonment. The defendant then appealed to
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, arguing that
"the increase of the sentences placed him in jeopardy for the
second time" in contravention of the constitutional guarantees. The court rejected this contention, reasoning that "It
has been held repeatedly by this court and by the Supreme
Court of the United States that a defendant can be tried a
second time for an offence when his prior conviction for that
offence has been set aside on his appeal. [Citations.] Hao the
IIIt may be noted t11at in California a statute, not hn'p,] on the
constitutional mandate against double jeopardy. indepelln~ntly pro·
scrihes douhle punishment for the snme "net or omission." (P,·n. ('odp,
§ 1i54; People v. Ti,lcman (1962) 57 Ca1.2d 574, 578 [2] [!!1 Cal.Rptr.
207,370 P.2d lOOj).)
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[defendant] been convicted and sentenced and if on his appeal the conviction had been reversed, a subsequent conviction followed by a longer sentence than the one initially imposed would not be objectionable." (185 N.E.2d at p. 740 [12].) On all fours with Hicks is Kohl/uss v. Warden of Connecticut State Prison (1962) 149 Conn. 692 [183 A.2d 626],
in which the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held
that a defendant had not been subjected to double jeopardy
when the minimum term of imprisonment specified in his
sentence was ordered increased in a review thereof sought by
him. The court in its opinion relied on Stroud v. United
States (1919) supra, 251 U.S. 15 [40 S.Ct. 50, 6{ T,.Ed. 1031.
and Murphy v. Massachusetts (1900) sttpra, 177 U.S. 155
[20 S.Ct. 639, 44 L.Ed. 711], and dismissed Green v. United
States (1957) supra, 355 U.S. 184 [78 S.Ot. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d
199, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119], as being "clearly distinguishable
from the case at bar," (183 A.2d at p. 628 [4].) It is established in California by both statutes and decisional law
that "The prosecution . . . commences when the indictment,
or information is filed in the superior court and normally
continues until ... the accused is 'brought to trial and punishment' or is acquitted." (People v. Tideman (1962) supra,
57 Ca1.2d 574, 579 [5]; Pen. Code, §§ 682, 683.) The granting of a new trial reopens the criminal action for all purposes; upon the new trial (unless trial by jury is waived)
the discretion of the jury in the selection of the penalty is
absolute. (People v. Green (1956) 47 Ca1.2d 209, 218 [7],
229 [302 P.2d 307] ; People v. Friend (1957) 47 Ca1.2d 749,
764-765 [11] [306 P.2d 463].)
The consequences of the majority's radical departure .from
established law and practice should be frankly faced. The
most immediate of these is that a new category of "automatic" appeals has been carved out by judicial decision, for all
defendants convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to
life imprisonment will hereafter have everything to gain and
nothing to lose by prosecuting review of their judgments at
the public expense no matter how frivolous and insubstantial
their grounds of appeal may be. Even more serious, however,
will be the effect of the majority's holding on established
sentencing practices of our trial courts. Until today it had
never been thought that when a judgment of conviction was
reversed at the defendant's behest, the former sentence or
disposition in any way tied the hands of the trial judge in
sentencing the defendant on a new judgment of conviction

.J
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for the same offense rendered upon retrial. Thus when a defendant is convicted of one of the many offenses punishable
either as a felony or as a misdemeanor (see Pen. Code, § 17)
and is sentenced as a misdemeanant, the trial judge on a new
conviction after reversal on appeal may sentenee thc defendant as a felon for the same offense. When a defendant is
convicted of a misdemeanor and a fine is imposed in lieu of
confinement in county jail, the trial judge on a new conviction of the same offense after reversal may instead sentence
the defendant to jailor to both a fine and jail (Pen. Code,
§ 19; see also § 672). When a defendant is convicted of two
or more offenses at the same trial and the judgment directs
that the sentences shall be served concurrently (Pen. Code,
§ 669), the tria 1 jud~(' 011 new convictions of the same offenses
after reversal may direct that the same sentences shall be
served consecutively. And when a convicted defendant is
granted probation, then appeals and secures a reversal of the
cause, the trial judge on a new conviction for the same
offense may deny probation and sentence the defendant to a
term of imprisonment.
Each of the foregoing propositions has long been part of
the settled law and practice of the trial courts of this state.
Each is now upsct by the majority's holding (ante, p. 497)
that the prohibition against double jeopardy applies in eases
where the law" allows the court or jury to fix different punishments for the same crime." If these practices have not
been affected by today's decision, it can only be because the
majority have decided that in California there is to be one
criminal law for death penalty cases and another criminal
law for all other cases. Such an unspoken discrimination is
without rational foundation and would in effect be grossly
unfair to the vast majority of defendants not on trial for
their lives-and to the public at large in California who are
entitled to the firm enforcement of laws enacted for their
protection.
The mention of the public at large-the seemingly forgotten law-abiding members of society-brings me to another
phase of this case, the presentation of which requires some
augmentation of the facts beyond those indicated by the
majority.
In the first place it may be noted that this defendant was
not in any scnse a victim of overreaching by the trial court
or the prosecntor. Rather, it appears the defendant-apparently aided by study of the Penal Code and other sources of
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legal lorc-scllcmrd his way to a new trial. As to his waiver
of a jury at the first trial, his plea of guilty, his discharge of
court-appointed counsel, and his procuring of a ne,v trial by
stipulation, the record shows items and entries as hereinafter
summarized or quoted .
.A.fter having been indicted for murder defelldant was provided with two attorneys; he asked for trial "on the issue of
present sanity pursuant to section 1368, Penal Code" and
four eminent psychiatrists were appointed (two designated
to be "on behalf of the defendant") to "examine said
defendant as to his present sanity." Trial by jury on this
issue was waived by both defendant and the district attorney; the reports of the doctors and testimonies of various
witnesses including the defendant were received, and the
court (Martin E. Rothenberg, Judge) found that defendant
was sane and able to cooperate with his counsel. Thereafter
defendant entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, and four psychiatrists were appointed "to
examine ... and determine whether ... defendant was sane at
the time of the commission of the crime, and render a report ... and to testify as to the mental condition of said defendant .... "
On January 16, 1962, the time fixed for trial, defendant
appeared with his attorneys before Judge Hugh H. Donovan,
waived a jury and consented "that the Court determine his
gUilt or innocence and if found guilty, the Court to determine the degree of the offense." Evidence was received, including the reports of six doctors, the transcript of the
Grand Jury proceedings and various photographs. The trial·
was then ordered continued to Monday, January 22,1962.
On Thursday, January 18, however, the record shows that
defendant with his two attorneys, and the district attorney
and his deputy, appeared and the following minute orders
were made:
1. Minutes of Thursday, January 18, 1962, 9 :30 a.m., lIon.
Hugh H. Donovan, Judge.
"The defendant with his counsel William Kretzmer and
Theodore Forurio [sic] and the District Attorney John
Nejedly and Deputy District Attorney Daniel Boatwright
appear in open Court at this time, and the Court fixcs this as
the time for hearing the defendant's motion.
"Thereupon the defendant moves the Court to discharge
the Court appointed attorneys and the defendant was duly
advised of his legal rights to be represented by self-employed
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attorneys and the Court orders William Kretzmer and Theodore Foruria, heretofore appointed by the Court, discharged
in tllis case.
"It is further ordered by the Court that said court appointed counsel be present at the further trial of this case on
.January 22, 1962 at 1 :30 o'clock p.m. to assist the defendant
in any way he may call upon them so to do. [Italics added.]
"Upon motion of defendant, it is by the Court ordered
that copies of docttments received into evidence, consisting of
doctors' reports, testimony at Grand Jury hearing and the
list of evidence submitted to the Court, be transmitted to
defendant.
"The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Shcriff."
2. Minutes of Monday, January 22, 1962, 9 :15 a.m., Hon.
Hugh H. Donovan, Judge.
"The defendant in pro pers and the District Attorney and
Daniel Boatwright, Deputy District Attorney appear in open
Court at this time, this being the time fixed by the Court for
the further trial of this cause. William Kretzmer appears in
open Court at this time in compliance with the order of the
Court. [Italics added.]
"Thereupon the defendant waives further argument in
this cause and withdraws his pleas heretofore entered and
now enters a plea of guilty of Violation of Section 187, California Penal Code as charged in the Indictment.
"The defendant waives argument as to the degree of the
charge herein and states that he has no legal cause to show
why judgment should not be pronounced at this time and no
sufficient cause being shown or appearing to the Court, the
Court thereupon renders its judgment;
"Thereupon the Court fixes the degree of the offense
charged in the indictment as first degree murder;
" I t is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the
said Ronald Kaye Henderson is guilty of the crime of Violation of Section 187, California Penal Code (Murder, first
degree) and that he be punished by imprisonment in the
California State Prison for life.
"Defendant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff for
delivery into the custody of the Director of Corrections at
the California Medical Facility at Vacaville, California.
"It is further ordered by the Court that the time for fixing
the fee of counsel William Kretzmer, heretofore, appointed
by the Court to represent the defendant in this cause, be set
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for Wednesday, January 31, 1962 at 9 :30 o'clock a.m.1I
"IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA
COn,TY - STA'l'E OF CALU'OHNIA
January 22, 1962
"Present, Hon. Hugh H. Donovan, Judge
No. 7605
"THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
Convicted of Violation
of Section 187, Penal
VS
"RONALD KAYE HENDERSON, Code (Murder)
Defendant

)

"The District Attorney, with the defendant came into
Court. 'l'!Je (h'felldant was duly informed by the Court of the
indictment found against him on the 11th day of September
A.D., 1961, for the crime of Violation of Section 187, California Penal Code (Murder) j of his arraignment on September 18, 1961 and of the appointment of psychiatrists to make
an examination and report as to the defendant's sanity; of
his trial by Court as to the defendant's sanity and the findings of the Court on November 13, 1961 that defendant is
sane; and of his plea of Not Guilty and Not Guilty by reason
of insanity; and of his trial by Court on January 16, 1962
and of his withdrawal of pleas heretofore entered and of his
plea of 'Guilty of the Offense Charged'; on the 22nd day of
January 1962 to-wit: Guilty of the crime of Violation of
Section 187, California Penal Code (Murder) and of the
Court fixing the degree of the offense on January 22, 1962, towit: Murder in the first degree.
"The defendant was then asked if he had any legal cause
to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him
to which he replies that he had none. And no sufficient cause
being shown or appearing to the Court, thereupon the Court
renders its judgment:
"That whereas the said Ronald Kaye Henderson having
been duly convicted in this Court of the crime of Violation of
Section 187, California Penal Code (Murder, first degree).
"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED, That the said Ronald Kaye Henderson is guilty
of the crime of Violation of Section 187, California Penal
Code (murder, first degree) and that he be punished by imIIThis does not mean that the proeeedings of January 22 were diseonIII this time; to tlie contrary. the minutes of January 22 continue
as shown.
lillllNI
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prisonmellt in the STATE PRISON OF CAJJIFOn~TA for
life and that the Sheriff of Contra Costa County deliver the
defendant into the custody of the Director of Correction at
the California Medical Facility at VacaYille, Califol'llia, and
there dcliver him.
"The defendant was then remanded to the custody of the
Sheriff of the County of Contra Costa to bc by llim dclivered
into the custody of the Director of Corrections at thc California Medical Facility at Vacaville, California."
As to Proceedings Relativc to Sccolld Judglllent
Psychiatric Report of Theo K. Miller, M.D., and Walter
Rapaport, M.D., dated September 6, 1962:
"The Honorable Wakefteld Taylor, Judge
Superior Court
Contra Costa County
Martinez, California
,. Dear Judge Taylor:
"Pursuant to your order the undersigned Theo K. M; 11er,
M.D., Superintendent and Medical Dir('ctor of the Napa
State Hospital, and \Valter Rapaport, M.D., Superilltl'IHh'llt
and Medical Director of the Agnews State Hospital, examined the above-named Ronald Kaye Henderson to determine
l1is mental condition with special reference to llis plea of Not
Guilty and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity to a chargc of
violation of Penal Code, Sec. 187 .
• , Be it remembered that both examiners had seen ~Ir. I1l'nderson and examined him on several occasions in Octob('r
1%1. In addition, one of us, Dr. Rapaport, examined Mr.
Henderson on December 24, 1961. Reports of these examinations were submitted to The Honorable Martin E. Rothenberg
on the date of October 30, 1961 and the report of Dr. Rapaport under date of December 27, 1961. '" [Defendant] went
to Vaeavillc on January 23, 1962 and in April was transferred to San Quentin Prison. He states that he was not placed
on a psychiatric ward as [sic] San Quentin. The defendant
states that he went to Court prior to going to Vacaville and
he states that Judge Donovan was the judge. At this time he
states that he never knew the charges that he was facing.
When asked about his statement at earlier examinations
wherein he told the examiners what the charges were, the
defendant replied, 'If you know anything you can bring it
up in court.' He states that when he went into Judge Donovan's court last year he had decided to fire his attorneys

)
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because he did not feel that they were giving him a good
deft'llse. lIe stat('s that 011 .January 24, th<' day aft('r nrriving
in Vacaville, he put in a Notice of Appeal and a lawyer was
appointed to represent him and the appeal was completed on
the grounds tllat the court had accepted a plea of Guilty at a
time when the defendant had no lawyer. He states th'lt the
matter of firing his lawyers and entering a plea of Gltilty
was his own idea and no one else had advised him. [Italics
added.J He states the lawyer who wrote the appeal ,vas
Robert Brilliant but that no,v he has another lawyer who was
appointed by the court in Martinez. He states that his case is
set for S<,ptember 18 and that his plea is Not Guilty and Not
Guilty by Reason of Insanity. He gives the victim's name as
Joyce l\Iarie Lovett, whom he had met about a year and a
half before the incident. He states that he is now in jail for
killing someone but goes on to say that he didn't kill anybody, that he wouldn't even kill a fly. Asked whether lIe had
beaten women in the past, he states, 'That is in the past. I am
talking about the present. There is no actual proof of anything. '
"The defendant states that he will answt'r any questions
except those about the actual homicide. Asked if this means
tllat he could ans,ver if he wanted to or that he doesn't know
the answers, the defendant replies that the examiners can
form their own conclusion, and repeats that he will not answer question [s] or give any information about the homicide.
He quotes the Penal Code and says, 'You can't walk into
court and plead guilty unless evidence is introduced to prove
a crime was committed, and there was no such evidence introduced in my case. I entered a plea of guilty to get a new
trial. I looked at books in the jail here and took a chance that
the judge would refuse to aecept my plea of guilty and appoint another attorney.' " (Italics added.)
Proceeding with his scheme to procure a new trial it appears (from the official record of the proceedings in this
action in the District Court of Appeal leading to the reversal
of the first judgment, and in more detail than is related by
the majority in respect thereto) that defendant under date of.
JUly 11, 1962, procured a stipulation as follows:
.. IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between the
parties to the above-entitled action, through tlleir respective
counsel, that the judgment of conviction entered against the
appellant on Jan. 22, 1962, by the Superior Court of the
State of California, in and for the County of Contra Costa,

)
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may be reversed by this Court and the matter remanded for
retrial. The basis for this stipulation is that the appellant
was erroneously allowed to enter a plea of guilty, while unrepresented by counsel, to a felony for which the maximum
punishment was death.
"Dated: July 11, 1962
"STANLEY MOSK, Attorney General
of the State of California
"JOHN S. McINERNY
Deputy Attorney General
John S. McInerny
Attorneys for Respondent
Robert M. Brilliant
ROBERT M. BRILLIANT
Attorney for Petitioner
Ronald Kaye Henderson
RONALD KAYE HENDERSON
Petitioner"

)

.)

The stipulation was then followed up by letters dated July
17, 1962, from defendant's then attorney, Robert M. Brilliant, and one dated July 18, 1962, from the Attorney General which read respectively as follo,vs:
"Consistent with our telephone conversation of even date
herewith with John S. McInerny, deputy attorney general,
and the Clerk in the above-entitled Court, hereiwith [sic] is
my stipulation, to wit: That the remittitur issue forthwith."
"Pursuant to the stipulation presently on file with the
Court and relating to the reversal of this case, the People of
the State of California hereby consent that the remittitur in
this case may issue immediately by this Court upon the
Court's entering the judgment of reversal "
With such stipulations before it the District Court of Appeal on July 19,1962, entered its order:
"Pursuant to a stipulation of the appellant and counsel
for the respective parties, the judgment of conviction entered
against the appellant on January 22, 1962, by the Superior
Court of the State of California in and for the County of
Contra Costa is reversed and the case is remanded for a new
trial. It is ordered tbat tbe remittitur issue forthwith. "
Reading of tbe record at the second trial reveals t11at tbe
evidence then taken was far more extensive and conclusive

J
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than that received at the first trial. The evidence now before
us is overwhelming not only that defendant perpetrated the
atrocities and killed his victim but also that he did so intentionally, designedly, intelligently, because he enjoyed doing
it, and bccause he had learned from having failed to kill at
least one woman (whom he had tortured to some extent as he
tortured his victim here) that despite her promises not to tell
on him if he would let her live, she did eventually tell. Indeed, it develops she could not well have concealed what he
had done because of the condition in which he left her. More
particularly as to the- case at bench the evidence establishes
that defendant weighed something over 200 pounds; his vietim weighed 100 pounds. The cruelties he perpetrated on her
before strangling her are too revolting to unnecessarily
detail, but some quotations from the transcript must be incorporated.
Indicative of the crafty legal acumen of this defendant is
the fact that he testified that the atrocious mutilations of the
deceased occurred after he had killed her by strangulation.
Thus he would avoid a finding of murder in the first degree,
which is required by statute (Pen. Code, § 189) where thc
proof shows that the killing was "perpetrated by means of
. " torture." Likewise this man said he could not recall
when or how he received the long scratches on his face (and
did not explain his" black eye") although the evidence was
unequivocal that he was "cold sober" shortly after receiving
them and at the time he was arranging to get his car in order
to dispose of the victim's body. He could not remember
things that were difficult to explain in any such way as
would absolve him from guilt but he testified that before
killing his victim he did not hit or cut her or do any other
violence to her body. He conveniently" passed out" or went
to sleep and he "woke" or "came out" only after the violent acts had been committed. This man by his trick on the
trial court-perhaps on the Attorney General-has secured
one new trial and seems about to cheat justice again. He
"Got a lot of pain and it made him black out like, and when
he came to, he had a can opener in his hand and ... he looked
at her and he realized he strangled Iter and cut Iter up from
the bottom part with the can opener to the belly button.•..
He said that he went into the bathroom and strangled her
and then he .... He just cut her up .... That he woke up
and he found the can opener in his hand." Is it not significant to even a reviewing court that he reiterates that he
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strangled her first and only then cut her up' Manifestly this
testimony was significant to the jury and the trial judge.
The record at the second trial reveals evidcnce pertinent to
both guilt and penalty which was not produced at the first
trial. It was not received at the first trial because defendant
at that trial avoided it by pleading gUilty. One new witness
at the second trial had been picked up by defendant at the
same bar at which about one month later he picked up the
victim in the case at bench. The witness related defendant's
following her from the bat", offering to give her a ride home,
her acceptance, her developing apprehension and attempt to
leave the car, his beating her, wounding her in the head, and
forcing her to disrobe and engage in unnatural acts. Then
"He got some kind of thing . .. and put it up in me ... he
rammed it up in me in my privates ... and he also had his
finger up my rectum .... " Each of these things, it appears
he also did to the victim he killed in the case at bench.
The transcript proceeds" ... he grabbed me by the llair ...
and beat my head down against the seat and said ... 'I think
I'll kill you now because, after all I did to you and after
what you did to me, , he said, 'I still didn't come' ....
"He says' I 'm going to bite you up all over your body and
I'm going to cut you wide open because I always wanted to
see what a woman looked like inside,' I said, 'Please don't
. . .. Don't kill me .. .' He said, 'It wouldn't do you any
good if you get killed.' I said, 'You'll die too,' and he said
'I don't care, when I go into these moods, what happens to
me.'...
"He ... bit me on my right leg and my privates and my
right side and bit me up on my breasts and my arms."
(Five color photographs graphically corroborating the witness's testimony were received in evidence.)
Relevant indeed to the case at bench the witness continued: "I said, 'Just let me get out of this car. I don't care,
any way, without any clothes, anything, just let me go. I
won't turn you in or anything....
"And he says, 'No, I'm afraid to let you. I'm afraid
you'll tell on me like the rest of the girls I have done.'"
However, although he kept her "pants, bra, slip, purse, and a
little jacket that went with the dress" she had on, he did let
her go.
She "ran to a house and started ringing the doorbell,"
was admitted, the police were called and she went to the San
Jose County Hospital. About two weeks later she received a
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telephone can from dcfendant, and he said, "Oh, yes. You
turned me in, didn't you f Now I'm going to get you. I'll
get you one way or the other. I'm going to kill you." She
reported that call to the police. That incident meant to
defendant that he would not be so indulgent as to let his next
victim live to tell her story. This record shows he kept that
resolution.
After studying the record it is impossible for me to conclude that the defendant has been denied any element of a
fair trial or due process, or that there has been a miscarriage
of justice by the conviction and sentence of the appellant. In
particular, although many instructions were necessarily
given to the jury to cover the multiple aspects of the case, the
charge (taken as a whole of course) is commendably comprehensive and free from error. The learned trial judge was
especially careful in defining the degrees of murder and the
necessity for proof of specific intent, reached by deliberation
and premeditation, as a basis for first degree murder. Among
other elements the judge emphasized that "To constitute thi:.:
kind and degree of homicide the killing must be accompanied
by a clear, deliberate intent to take life. The intent to kill
must be the result of deliberation and must have been formed
upon a pre-existing reflection and not under a heat of passion
or other condition such as precludes the idea of deliberation .
. .. To constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the
slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and
the reasons for and against such choice, and, having in mind
the consequences, decide to and commit the unlawful act
causing death."
I would affirm the jUdgment.
McComb, J., concurred.
Respondcnt's petition for a rehearing was denied December 18, 1963. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

